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ABSTRACT 
Entry and Experimentation in Oligopolistic Markets for Experience Goods 
by Daniel Krähmer* 
We investigate a two-period Bertrand market in which one seller introduces a new 
product of uncertain quality. The new product competes with an alternative good of 
known quality. Ex ante neither sellers nor consumers know the value of the new 
product. While consumers can learn their valuation by actual consumption 
(experimentation), sellers cannot observe experimentation outcomes. Thus, asymmetric 
information arises if the buyer experiments. As a result, the equilibrium is inefficient, 
and too little entry occurs. 
 
Keywords: Entry, experimentation, asymmetric information, bandit problem, Bertrand 
competition 
JEL classification: L13, L15, D82, D83 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Markteintritt und Experimentation in oligopolistischen Märkten für 
Erfahrungsgüter 
Das Papier untersucht einen zweiperiodigen Bertrand-Markt, in dem ein Verkäufer ein 
neues Gut unbekannter Qualität einführt. Das neue Produkt konkurriert mit einem 
etablierten Produkt bekannter Qualität. Ex ante kennen weder die Verkäufer noch die 
Käufer den Wert des neuen Gutes. Ein Käufer kann seine Wertschätzung für das neue 
Produkt erfahren, indem er es ausprobiert (Experimentation). Die Verkäufer hingegen 
können nicht beobachten, ob der Käufer zufrieden war, wenn er das neue Gut 
konsumiert hat. Dadurch entsteht asymmetrische Information. Dies führt zu einem 
ineffizienten Gleichgewicht und zu zu geringem Markteintritt. 
                                                 
*  I would like to thank Helmut Bester, Jürgen Bierbaum, Kai A. Konrad, Roland Strausz, and two 
anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
1 Introduction
When a new good whose quality is uncertain is introduced, buyers may learn their
valuation for the new good through actual consumption. Sellers, however, can often
not observe the consumers’ private experience with the new good. If buyers purchase
repeatedly, this gives rise to asymmetric information between sellers and buyers in
later periods.
An example is opening a new restaurant. By trying it out, customers can learn
whether they like the new cook’s way of cooking. Generally, the restaurant’s owner
cannot observe directly, whether customers are satis…ed or not. The latter is also
true for many experience goods for daily use, such as packaged shirts or canned
drinks, durables whose utility for the consumer is only revealed over time, such
as personal computers, particular types of services, for instance telecommunication
services, or workers whose ability is unobervable ex ante. There are many other
examples where the consumers’ experience with the new good is not revealed to
sellers. Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that, in reality, this may be the rule
rather than the exception.
The paper explores the consequences of this informational asymmetry for a
duopolistic Bertrand market in a simple two period framework. In each period,
a risky seller who initially introduces a new product competes with a safe seller who
o¤ers an alternative good of known quality. The provider of the new product may
be an entrant into a previously monopolistic market, or the new good may be a
re-launch of an outdated design. A buyer can learn about her valuation of the new
product by actual consumption. In this sense, the new product is an experience
good (Nelson (1972)). The buyer’s valuation for the safe good may be known from
previous experience or from an exogenous recommendation, for instance, a consumer
guide book.
From the perspective of the consumer, a seller is therefore one arm of a two-
armed bandit. On the one hand, by trying out the risky good (experimentation),
the buyer learns about her valuation. On the other hand, the safe good provides a
safe bene…t, but does not give any information about what her true taste for the new
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good is. That is, the buyer faces the well-known intertemporal trade-o¤ between
exploration and exploitation.
The aim of the analysis is to determine when experimentation or, equivalently,
entry occurs in equilibrium and to study the welfare properties of the equilibrium.
We say that experimentation, or entry, occurs if the buyer chooses the risky seller
in the …rst period in equilibrium.
Our results are as follows: …rst, the market equilibrium is in general ine¢cient,
that is, social welfare in equilibrium is lower than social welfare in the social planner
solution. Second, in equilibrium there is too little entry compared with the planner
solution.
What drives these results is that experimentation outcomes are private informa-
tion. For, if the buyer experiments in period 1, sellers cannot condition their prices
on the buyer’s valuation in the second period. Therefore, with positive probability,
the buyer chooses the ”wrong” seller in period 2, that is, the seller for whom her
valuation is actually lowest. As a consequence, a welfare loss occurs.
The ine¢cient use of information reduces the bene…ts of the risky choice. Thus,
the buyer’s gross valuation for the risky seller in period 1 is reduced relative to the
value of the risky arm in the planner solution. By contrast, the gross valuation
for the safe seller is the same as the value of the safe arm in the planner solution.
Yet, as a result of price competition, in equilibrium the buyer will choose the seller
for whom she has the higher gross valuation. Therefore, if a planner is indi¤erent
between the risky arm and the safe arm, the buyer in the market game will strictly
prefer the safe seller. In this sense, there is too little entry in equilibrium.
Moreover, we discuss whether the buyer is willing to pay ex ante for information
about the risky good. We shall identify a trade-o¤ between information and com-
petition. An informed buyer enjoys an information rent relative to her uninformed
counterpart, but information transforms the pricing game in such a way that sellers’
market power is increased, competition is weakened, and higher prices are charged.
Our paper is a …rst step towards extending the market experimentation liter-
ature to the case of privately observed experimentation outcomes. Several other
papers (Bergemann/Välimäki (1996, 1997, 2001), Keller/Rady (2001)) study the
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relationship between entry, experimentation and oligopolistic competition, but in
all of them experimentation outcomes are public information. Except for the …nite
time horizon, our model is closest to Bergemann/Välimäki (1996). Because exper-
imentation outcomes are public information in their setting, in each stage sellers
can condition their prices on the buyer’s valuation. In contrast to our results, the
market solution and the social planner solution are then identical.
Our paper is also related to the literature on multi-armed bandit problems.1 In
the traditional bandit literature, the pay-o¤ characteristics of an arm are exoge-
nously given. By contrast, in our model, as in Bergemann/Välimäki (1996), the
bandit is rendered a player such that the bandit’s pay-o¤ characteristics are subject
to a player’s choice. Active bandits are also considered in Bar-Isaak (2000). In his
model, bandits are sellers who are privately informed about whether they provide
high or low quality on average. Good sellers can signal their type by accepting
worse terms of trade than bad sellers and may thereby survive even when buyers
experience long streaks of unfavourable experimentation outcomes.
The experience goods literature has mainly focussed on how the lemon’s problem
a la Akerlof, which arises in the context of non-contractible quality, can be overcome.
The lemon’s problem is typically mitigated when …rms can build up a reputation2,
or when they can signal high quality3. In our model, the lemon’s problem is not
an issue because sellers are uninformed. Formally similar to our setting is a model
by Kim (1992), who studies the pricing behaviour of a monopolistic seller of an
experience good who, as in our case, is uninformed about consumers’ tastes and
cannot observe experimentation outcomes.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 the
model is analyzed and the main results are derived. Section 4 concludes.
1The seminal paper in the bandit literature is Rothschild (1974), who considers the price setting
behaviour of a local monopolist in the face of an unknown demand function. Berry/Fristedt (1985)
provides an introduction to bandit problems.
2See, e.g., the in‡uential article of Klein/Le-er (1981). Further papers on reputation formation
are Shapiro (1982, 1983a, 1983b), Liebeskind/Rumelt (1989).
3See, e.g., Allen (1984), Riordan (1986), Hoerger (1993).
4For a study on price and quality patterns of experience goods within a continuous time frame-
work with a continuum of …rms and consumers see also Gale/Rosenthal (1994).
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2 The Model
There are two time periods, t = 1; 2. There are two sellers, a safe seller, S , and a
risky seller, R. In each period sellers produce each a unit of a good at zero cost.
There is one buyer, B, who buys at most one unit of the two goods in each period.
In each period, sellers engage in price competition, and the buyer decides whether
to buy a good and, if she does, from whom of the sellers.
B’s instantaneous valuation for (or her willingness to pay for, or her gross utility
of) a good equals her expected instantaneous valuation for that good.5 From B’s
perspective, goods di¤er with respect to their riskiness. While B knows her valuation
for the good delivered by S , she is ex ante ignorant about her true valuation for the
good delivered by R.
Suppose that B’s instantaneous valuation for S ’s good is known to all players
to be equal to ¸ 2 [0; 1]. By contrast, ex ante, B’s true instantaneous valuation
x 2 [0; 1] of R’s good is known neither by sellers nor by B. However, players hold
a common belief about B’s instantaneous valuation for R’s good, that is, from the
perspective of the players, B’s valuation for R’s good is a random variable X with
values in [0; 1]. Let F be the cumulative density function of X, and let f = F 0
be the corresponding probability density function. We assume that X has …nite
…rst moment, and that f is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly positive on [0; 1].
Suppose that F is common knowledge among all players.
B can learn x with certainty by consuming R’s good.6 That is, the good of R is
an experience good, and, from the perspective of the buyer, each seller is an arm of
a two-armed bandit. We say that experimentation, or entry, occurs when B chooses
R in period 1, and we call her observation x experimentation outcome. We assume
that the experimentation outcome is B’s private information. That is, we interpret
x as B’s subjective taste for R’s good which cannot be observed by sellers.7
5Risk-neutrality is assumed for simplicity of exposition. However, quasi-linearity is a crucial
assumption.
6We could assume that the buyer gets an imperfect signal about her valuation. However, in a
two-period setting this does not alter the logic of the model.
7The fact that sellers cannot observe experimentation outcomes may seem inconsistent with the
assumption that the buyer’s valuation for the safe good is common knowledge. However, it would
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The timing is as follows. In period 1, R and S simultaneously set prices p1,
and q1 respectively. Given these prices, the buyer chooses whether to buy a good,
and, if so, from whom of the sellers. If the buyer experiments, she learns her true
instantaneous valuation x for the risky good, whereas in the other case she does not.
Sellers observe consumption decisions, but they cannot observe experimentation
outcomes. Call AI the information set reached if B experiments, and denote by
NI the information set reached if B does not experiment.8 Here, the capitals refer
to Asymmetric Information, and No Information respectively. In period 2, R and
S simultaneously set prices p2, and q2 respectively. Finally, given these prices, the
buyer chooses whether to buy a good, and if so, from whom of the sellers.
We assume that players are Bayesian sequentially rational and that they play a
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Since the time horizon is …nite and to save in
notation, we assume that players do not discount stage 2 pay-o¤s. Furthermore, to
reduce case distinctions, we assume that E [X] · ¸.9
Remark: F can be interpreted as the distribution of valuations for R’s good among
a continuum [0; 1] of consumers where a consumer’s location x 2 [0; 1] is her valua-
tion for R’s good. Notice that this interpretation includes the case where consumers
have heterogenous tastes not only for R’s good but also for S’s good. For what
matters is only a consumer’s di¤erence x ¡ ¸ between the valuations for the two
goods. If ¸ is a continuous function of x, we obtain the same results by replacing
F (x) by F (x) = F (x¡ ¸ (x)) and assuming that the valuation for the safe seller’s
good equals 0.
be easy to replace the safe good by a second risky experience good. This would only complicate
the analysis without yielding signi…cant additional insights.
8To be precise, for each pair (p1; q1) of stage 1 prices there is one information set of type AI
and one of NI .
9 If E [X ] > ,¸ then the trade-o¤ between learning and instant grati…cation vanishes. From a
social planner point of view, the risky alternative then dominates not only in terms of future but
also in terms of current bene…ts.
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3 Analysis of the Model
As usual we solve for the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game by backward
induction.
3.1 The Second Stage
3.1.1 Information Set NI: Uninformed Players
At information set NI, no party has information about B’s true valuation for R’s
good. The pricing game at NI is then a classical Bertrand game where B’s valuation
for R’s good is E [X], and that for S ’s good is ¸. We assume the following tie-
breaking rule for the case where B is indi¤erent between R and S : if there is
exactly one seller who could reduce prices slightly without making negative pro…ts,
B chooses that seller. In all other cases, if both or none of the sellers could reduce
prices, B chooses S with probability 1.
This implies that the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the
pricing game is given by p = 0; q = ¸ ¡ E [X],10 and B chooses S in equilibrium.
We note that B’s expected pay-o¤ under informational setting NI , uNI , is
uNI = E [X] : (1)
3.1.2 Information set AI: Informed Buyer, Uninformed Sellers
At information set AI the buyer has private information about her valuation x of X
for R’s good.11 To derive the equilibrium of the continuation game, we go through
players’ decisions in more detail.
Buyer’s decision: Given prices p and q, the buyer chooses R if
x¡ p > ¸¡ q; (2)
10 In this subsection we suppress time subscripts as far as possible and always mean period 2
prices when we use plain p and q.
11For a general account of price competition with an informed buyer and discrete valuations see
Mosarini/Ottaviani (2001).
7
and she chooses S if the reverse inequality holds. If B is indi¤erent, we use the same
tie-breaking rule as above.12
Sellers’ decision: Given B’s decision, the expected period 2 pro…ts of R, ¼R, and
of S, ¼S, are
¼R (p; q) = p ¢ P [X ¡ p > ¸¡ q] (3)
= p (1 ¡ F (¸+ p¡ q)) ;
¼S (p; q) = q ¢ P [X ¡ p < ¸ ¡ q] (4)
= qF (¸ + p¡ q) :
The necessary …rst order conditions for a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game are
thus given by
1¡ F (¸ + p ¡ q) ¡ p ¢ f (¸ + p¡ q) = 0; (5)
F (¸ + p¡ q)¡ q ¢ f (¸ + p¡ q) = 0: (6)
The su¢cient second order conditions for a solution (p; q) of (5), (6) to be an equi-
librium are given by
¡2f (¸ + p¡ q) ¡ p ¢ f 0 (¸ + p ¡ q) < 0; (7)
¡2f (¸+ p ¡ q) + q ¢ f 0 (¸ + p ¡ q) < 0: (8)
Notice that this condition requires the curvature (f 0=f) of F to be neither extremely
large nor extremely small at a solution (p; q) of (5), (6). Intuitively, the curvature
of F measures the speed at which a seller’s ”market share” reacts to small price
changes. If a seller’s market share falls drastically through a price increase, then,
since market shares add up to 1, the other seller might pro…tably deviate by reducing
prices and thereby increasing sales drastically.
The latter cannot happen if the size of the curvature is bounded from below and
above. A condition which sets a limit on the curvature of F , and which is su¢cient
for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies, is given in Bester (1992), p.
438. Bester shows that an equilibrium exists if F is twice continuously di¤erentiable
12Notice that B is indi¤erent at AI with probability 0.
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on (0; 1) and satis…es the following condition:
¡2
z
· ¡f
0 (x¡ ¸)
f (x¡ ¸) ·
2
z
for all x 2 (0; 1) ; (9)
where
z = max
½
1
F (¸)
;
1
1¡ F (¸)
¾
: (10)
From now on we shall assume that (9) holds. This implies that the pricing game
has an equilibrium (p; q) in pure strategies. Notice that the equilibrium need not
be unique. In what follows we shall assume that there is a focal equilibrium that
sellers coordinate on and which the buyer understands is going to be played.
3.1.3 The value of information
The second stage of the game can be used to ask whether the buyer is willing to pay
for information about the risky seller’s good. Denote by uAI the buyer’s expected
pay-o¤ in the continution game following information set AI. Then the buyer’s
willingness to pay for information is given by the di¤erence uAI ¡ uNI between the
pay-o¤s when informed and when uninformed. Let (p; q) be an equilibrium of the
pricing game at AI, and denote by ¢ = p ¡ q the equilibrium price di¤erential.
Recall that at information set NI, the buyer obtains gross utility ¸ and pays a price
qNI = (¸¡ E [X]). The willingness to pay for information can be written in terms
of the di¤erence in gross valuation and the di¤erence in prices, that is,
uAI ¡ uNI = P [X > ¸ +¢] (E [X jX > ¸ +¢]¡ ¸) (11)
+P [X < ¸ +¢] (¸¡ ¸)
¡ ¡pP [X > ¸ + ¢]+ qP [X < ¸ +¢]¡ qNI¢ :
The …rst two lines are the gross value of information. Whether this is positive
or negative depends on the size of ¢. If ¢ is not too small, the gross value of
information will be positive. The third line indicates a price e¤ect: at information
set AI both sellers have some market power while at information set NI they play
a classical Bertrand game with ‡at demand. Inserting qNI = (¸ ¡ E [X]) yields
uAI ¡ uNI = P [X > ¸+ ¢] (E [X jX > ¸+ ¢]¡ E [X ]) (12)
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+P [X < ¸ +¢] (¸ ¡ E [X ])
¡pP [X > ¸ +¢]¡ qP [X < ¸ +¢] :
Whatever the buyer learns, that is, whether X > ¸ + ¢ or X < ¸ + ¢, the gross
utility when informed is higher than net utility when uninformed. This can be seen
as a form of favourable selection. However, due to sellers’ increased market power at
information set AI, the buyer may have to pay a relatively high price when informed.
To see which e¤ect dominates, consider the special case of a symmetric market.
In a symmetric market, the share of buyers who have a higher valuation for R is the
same as the share of buyers who have a higher valuation for S , that is, F (¸) = 1=2.
If F (¸) = 1=2, equilibrium prices can be easily computed. Indeed, it follows from
Proposition 1 that
p = q =
8<: 12f (¸) if f (¸) > 12¸¸ if f (¸) · 12¸ (13)
is an equilibrium of the pricing game. Equivalently, p = q = min
n
1
2f (¸) ; ¸
o
. In
particular, ¢ = 0. Hence,
uAI ¡ uNI = P [X > ¸] (E [X jX > ¸]¡ E [X]) (14)
+P [X < ¸] (¸ ¡ E [X ]) ¡min
½
1
2f (¸)
; ¸
¾
:
Thus, the overall e¤ect depends on the size of f (¸). Indeed, the value of infor-
mation increases in f (¸). Intuitively, f (¸) is a measure for sellers’ market power
at equilibrium prices. Sellers trade o¤ price reductions against increases in market
share. If f (¸) is large, B’s valuation for R’s good is relatively concentrated around
¸, and a relatively high number of consumsers can be attracted through price re-
ductions. That is, competition is strong, and, as a result, prices are driven down
in equilibrium. Thus, the gross favourable selection e¤ect may outweigh the market
power e¤ect. On the other hand, if f (¸) is small, sellers have relatively high mar-
ket power, and prices are relatively high in equilibrium. Accordingly, the value of
information will be low. In this case, ex ante an uninformed buyer may be better
o¤ than her informed counterpart, and therefore a buyer may not be willing to pay
for information.
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3.2 The First Stage
As a benchmark case, we shall …rst consider the social planner solution. Then we
turn to the market allocation, and, …nally, we compare them.
3.2.1 The Social Planner Solution
We consider the social planner solution in which the planner is as informed as
the buyer in the market model, that is, if the planner strategy is to experiment
in period 1, the planner can observe the experimentation outcome. This is just
the solution to the two-armed bandit problem with one risky arm paying x with
density f (x) and with one safe arm paying ¸ with probability 1. To break ties,
we assume that the planner, if indi¤erent, selects the safe arm with probability 1.13
Hence, given experimentation in t = 1, the planner speci…es to choose R in t = 2
if the experimentation outcome x exceeds ¸, and to choose S if x · ¸. Given no
experimentation in t = 1, the planner speci…es to choose R in t = 2 if and only if
E [X ]> ¸. The latter is however ruled out by assumption.14 Hence, experimentation
in t = 1 yields (…rst best) utility
WRFB = E [X] +P [X > ¸] ¢ E [X jX > ¸] + P [X < ¸] ¢ ¸; (15)
whereas selection of the safe arm in t = 1 yields
WSFB = ¸ + ¸: (16)
The social surplus in the planner solution is therefore
UFB (¸) = max
©
WRFB;WSFB
ª
; (17)
and the social planner strategy prescribes experimentation if, and only if, WRFB¡
WSFB > 0. De…ne
g (¸) = WRFB ¡WSFB (18)
as the incentive to experiment in the social planner solution. Notice that g is strictly
decreasing in ¸.15 Hence, there is a unique …rst best cut-o¤ point ¸FB with g
¡
¸FB
¢
=
0, and experimentation is e¢cient for all ¸ < ¸FB.
13This is consistent with the buyer’s tie-breaking rule imposed in the market game.
14Otherwise the planner solution would always prescribe the risky arm in period 1.
15By Leibniz’ rule it follows immediately that g0 < 0.
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3.2.2 The Market Solution
We now turn to the market game when experimentation outcomes are private infor-
mation to B. We shall show that—provided sellers do not charge the same prices
in period 2—the market equilibrium is ine¢cient, and that, in a sense made more
precise later, this ine¢ciency gives rise to under entry.
Before solving explicitely for stage 1 equilibrium behaviour, it is instructive to
think directly about social surplus in the market game. Suppose, prices in period
1 are given, and B has chosen a particular alternative in period 1, that is, to ex-
periment or not, be it optimal or not. Suppose further that an equilibrium of the
respective continuation game is played. Now consider players’ pay-o¤s along that
path in the game tree: due to quasi-linear utility B’s expected (net) life-cycle utility
equals B’s expected gross life-cycle utility net of the expected life-cycle payments
transferred to sellers. Sellers’ combined expected life-cycle pro…ts are equal to B’s
expected life-cycle payments to sellers. Therefore, total social surplus along a par-
ticular play path is just equal to B’s expected gross life-cycle utility along that
path.
We now compute B’s gross life-cycle utility along all possible paths conditional
on optimal continuation in period 2. If B chooses R in t = 1, then she obtains gross
instantaneous utility E [X] in period 1, and play reaches information set AI. In this
case B obtains gross period 2 utility
P [X > ¸+ ¢] ¢ E [X jX > ¸+ ¢] +P [X < ¸+ ¢] ¢ ¸; (19)
where
¢ = p2 ¡ q2 (20)
denotes the equilibrium price di¤erential in period 2. Hence, B’s gross life-cycle
utility from experimenting, WR, is given by
WR = E [X] + P [X > ¸ + ¢] ¢ E [X jX > ¸ + ¢]+ P [X < ¸+ ¢] ¢ ¸: (21)
If B chooses S in t = 1, she obtains ¸ in period 1, and play reaches information
set NI. In this case she stays with S and obtains ¸ again. Therefore, B’s gross
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life-cycle utility from choosing S in period 1, WS, is given by
WS = ¸+ ¸. (22)
As for e¢ciency, we now compare the social surplus in the market equilibrium with
that in the social planner solution. For this purpose, suppose that an equilibrium
of the market game exists and that ¢ 6= 0. Denote by UM the social surplus in
the market equilibrium. That is, UM = WR, if B experiments in equilibrium, and
UM = WS otherwise.
Consider …rst the case in which S is chosen in t = 1 both in the market equi-
librium and in the social planner solution. Then UM = WS = 2¸ and U FB =
WSFB = 2¸. Thus, UM = UFB.
Consider next cases in which S is chosen in t = 1 in the market equilibrium,
but where the social planner strategy prescribes experimentation in t = 1. Then
UM = 2¸, and UFB = WRFB ¸ WSFB = 2¸, where the inequality holds because
experimentation is e¢cient in that case. Hence, UFB ¸ UM .
Next, consider cases in which experimentation is chosen in t = 1 in both the mar-
ket equilibrium and in the social planner solution: Suppose, for instance, ¢ > 0.
Then, B’s choice in period 2 in the market di¤ers from that in the social planner
solution in period 2 only when experimentation outcomes x are in (¸; ¸+ ¢). Notice
that in the market game B chooses S in t = 2 for all values x 2 (¸; ¸ +¢) although
her period 2 valuation x for R’s good exceeds that for S ’s good. On the other hand,
the social planner solution prescribes the seller for which B has the higher valua-
tion, that is, R. Therefore, with probability P [¸ < X < ¸ + ¢] the buyer obtains
only gross utility ¸ in the market, whereas in the planner solution a gross utility of
E [X j¸ < X < ¸+ ¢] > ¸ is attained. We state this …nding in Proposition 3.
Proposition 1: Suppose ¢ 6= 0. Then WR < WRFB for all ¸ 2 [0; 1].
Proof : Suppose ¢ > 0. Then
WR ¡WRFB = P [X > ¸ + ¢] ¢ E [X jX > ¸ +¢] + P [X < ¸ + ¢] ¢ ¸
¡P [X > ¸] ¢ E [X jX > ¸] + P [X < ¸] ¢ ¸
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= P [X > ¸ + ¢] (E [X jX > ¸ + ¢]¡ E [X jX > ¸ +¢])
+P [¸ +¢ > X > ¸] (¸¡ E [X j¸+ ¢ > X > ¸])
+P [X < ¸] (¸ ¡ ¸)
= P [¸ +¢ > X > ¸] (¸¡ E [X j¸+ ¢ > X ¸ ¸]) :
The claim follows since ¸ < E [X j¸+ ¢ > X > ¸]. For ¢ < 0, the same argument
applies. ¤
Consider …nally cases in which R is chosen in t = 1 in the market equilibrium, but
the social planner strategy prescribes choosing S in t = 1. The latter implies that
UFB = WSFB ¸ WRFB. But, with Proposition 1, this implies UFB > WR = UM:
The last two paragraphs, particularly, show that the social planner surplus
strictly dominates the social surplus in the market equilibrium whenever experi-
mentation is prescribed by the social planner strategy, that is, whenever ¸ < ¸FB.
We summarize these observations in
Proposition 2: Suppose ¢ 6= 0. Then UM · UFB for all ¸ 2 [0; 1] with the
inequality being strict for all ¸ < ¸FB.
The preceding considerations characterize the welfare implications of asymmetric
information in terms of the price di¤erential ¢. The following proposition charac-
terizes ¢ in terms of the underlying distribution F .
Proposition 3: ¢ 6= 0() F (¸) 6= 1=2, and ¢ < 0() F (¸) > 1=2.
Proof : By adding up sellers’ …rst order conditions (5), (6) and solving for F (¸ +¢),
we obtain
F (¸ + ¢) = 1=2 ¡ (1=2)¢f (¸ +¢) : (23)
Thus, if ¢ = 0 solves (23), it follows that F (¸) = 1=2. Likewise, if ¢ < 0, then
F (¸ +¢) > 1=2. Hence, since F is increasing, F (¸) > F (¸ + ¢) > 1=2.
On the other hand, if F (¸) = 1=2, then ¢ = 0 is a solution to (23). Moreover,
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if F (¸) > 1=2 and ¢ ¸ 0, then the left hand side is strictly larger than 1=2, and
the left hand side is weakly smaller than 1=2, a contradiction. ¤
The proposition says that ine¢ciencies arise if, and only if, the market is not sym-
metric. If, say, F (¸) > 1=2, then after experimentation the buyer is more likely
to have a higher valuation for S than for R. This advantage enables S to quote a
higher price than R so that ¢ < 0.
We can conclude that the market equilibrium, provided it exists, is ine¢cient
for all ¸ < ¸FB. The e¢ciency loss obtains because the buyer chooses the wrong
seller with positive probability in period 2 of the market game. This is due to the
presence of a non-zero price di¤erential in period 2 which results from asymmetric
information. In this sense, stage 2 prices fail to perform their role as informative
signals of market conditions.
Remark: In the market model with public experimentation outcomes, Berge-
mann/Välimäki (1996) show that the market solution is identical with the social
planner solution and thus e¢cient. In our simple model it can be easily seen why
this is the case. If experimentation outcomes are public information, sellers can
condition stage 2 prices on the experimentation outcome x. Then the unique pure
strategy equilibrium of the continuation game following experimentation in period
1 is given by
p2 (x) =
8<: x¡ ¸ if x > ¸0 if x · ¸ ; (24)
q2 (x) =
8<: 0 if x > ¸¸ ¡x if x · ¸ ; (25)
and R will make sales in period 2 if x > ¸ while S will make sales in period 2 if
x · ¸. Therefore, the e¢cient seller is always chosen in equilibrium, and there is no
welfare loss. ¤
We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium. Notice that the pricing game
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in period 1 can be seen as a one-shot Bertrand game. However, unlike in the classic
one-shot Bertrand game, period 1 prices need not be non-negative since sellers may
make positive pro…ts in period 2. Intuitively, competition squeezes prices until one
of the two sellers reaches a price below which he is better o¤ when not selling than
when selling in period 1. The other seller will then charge a price such that the
buyer is just indi¤erent between sellers.
More precisely, for i = R;S denote by ¼i2 (AI ), and ¼
i
2 (NI) respectively, seller i’s
period 2 pro…t in the continuation game following AI, and NI respectively. Then,
the smallest price bp1 which R is willing to charge in period 1 and below which R is
better o¤ when not selling in period 1 is given by
bp1 + ¼R2 (AI) = ¼R2 (NI ) : (26)
Notice that ¼R2 (NI) = 0, thus, bp1 = ¡¼R2 (AI).
Likewise, the minimum price bq1 which S is willing to charge in period 1 is given
by bq1+ ¼S2 (NI) = ¼S2 (AI) : (27)
As above, we use the following tie-breaking rule for B: if exactly one seller sets his
minimum price, B chooses the other seller. In all other cases, that is, if both or
none of the sellers set their minimum price, B chooses S .
Due to price competition, in equilibrium one of the sellers must charge his min-
imum price. Due to our tie-breaking rule this will be the seller who does not make
sales in period 1.16
Suppose that B experiments in equilibrium. Then it is S who charges his mini-
mum price bq1, and S is just indi¤erent between selling and not selling in period 1.
However, in equilibrium it must be that also B is indi¤erent between the sellers. For
otherwise R could raise period 1 price and increase his pro…ts. Therefore, since B
and S are indi¤erent, it follows that the combined surplus B and S achieve together
equals the surplus they would achieve if B chose S , that is, the combined surplus
WS¡¼R2 (NI) from not experimenting. Accordingly, R must extract the rest of the
16Except if both sellers charge their minimum price in equilibrium. In this case S makes sales
in period 1.
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total surplus from experimentation. Hence, because ¼R2 (NI) = 0, R’s equilibrium
life-cycle pro…t conditional on selling in period 1 is WR ¡ WS . In equilibrium,
of course, for experimentation to obtain R’s pro…t from selling in period 1 must
be larger than R’s pro…t from not selling in period 1. Hence, it must hold that
WR¡WS > 0 + ¼R2 (NI) = 0.17
By a similar argument, if B does not experiment in equilibrium, then it must
hold that WR ¡ WS · 0. Thus, B experiments in equilibrium if, and only if,
WR¡WS > 0.
In other words, price competition in stage 1 implies that the buyer chooses the
seller for whom her gross life-cycle utility is highest. The buyer’s net willingness
to pay for information, as discussed in section 3.1.1, is irrelevant in equilibrium
insofar as sellers’ stage 2 pro…ts will be re‡ected in period 1 prices. If, say, the
value of information is negative, the risky seller has to reduce prices in period 1 so
as to compensate the buyer up front for her anticipated loss in period 2. A seller’s
competitive position in period 1 is therefore equal to the buyer’s gross valuation.
To determine equilibrium prices, consider …rst the case in which B experiments.
Notice that R’s life-cycle pro…t conditional on selling in period 1 is equal to period 1
price plus period 2 pro…ts in the continuation game following AI. Thus, WR¡WS =
p1 + ¼R2 (AI). With bp1 = ¡¼R2 (AI) it follows that the R’s period 1 price equals
p1 =WR ¡WS + bp1: (28)
Likewise, if B does not experiment in equilibrium, the period 1 price charged by S
is
q1 =WS ¡WR + bq1: (29)
We summarize our …ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose WR ¡WS > 0. Then B experiments and entry occurs.
Furthermore, sellers’ equilibrium prices in period 1 are given by the pair
p1 =WR ¡WS + bp1; q1 = bq1:
17The strict inequality results from our tie-breaking rule.
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Suppose WR ¡ WS · 0. Then B does not experiment and entry does not occur.
Furthermore, sellers’ equilibrium prices in period 1 are given by the pair
p1 = bp1; q1 = WS ¡WR+ bq1:
Though not stated explicitly, this is the unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the market game.
We shall now use Proposition 4 to study when entry occurs in the market equi-
librium compared to the social planner solution. We de…ne
h (¸) =WR ¡WS (30)
as the incentive to experiment in the market equilibrium or the risky seller’s incentive
to enter the market.
In order to compare the market solution to the social planner solution, we com-
pare the functions g = WRFB ¡ WSFB and h. Since WSFB = WS , the next
statement follows immediately from Proposition 1.
Proposition 5: Suppose ¢ 6= 0, then h (¸) < g (¸) for all ¸ 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 7 implies that there is a market equilibrium cut-o¤ ¸ME < ¸FB af-
ter which experimentation will not obtain in equilibrium. More precisely, let ¸ME =
supf¸ jh (¸) = 0g be the largest root of h. Then it follows that h (¸) < 0 for all
¸ > ¸ME , and Proposition 5 implies that ¸ME < ¸FB.
Therefore, if ¸ 2 £¸ME; ¸FB¢, the risky seller stays out of the market although
optimally he should be chosen. Again, this is because information is used ine¢-
ciently in period 2. This reduces the buyer’s gross valuation for the risky seller
in period 1, WR, compared to the value of the risky arm in the planner solution,
WRFB. By contrast, the informational externality does not impair the gross val-
uation for the safe seller, WS . Therefore, the ine¢ciency weakens only the risky
seller’s competitive position but not that of the safe seller. As a consequence, if
¸ 2 £¸ME; ¸FB¢, the entry price necessary to induce the buyer to experiment does
not allow the risky seller to make positive pro…ts and he stays out of the market al-
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though entry is socially optimal. In this sense, there is too little entry in the market
equilibrium.
We conclude this subsection with a summary of the results obtained and the case
of uniform X.
Lemma 1: Suppose ¢ 6= 0. Then the market equilibrium is ine¢cient for all
¸ < ¸FB and leads to under entry for all ¸ 2 £¸ME; ¸FB¢.
Example: Let X s U ([0; 1]). Then we have the following equilibrium values.
h (¸) =
1
2
¸2¡ 2¸ + 17
18
; g (¸) =
1
2
¸2¡ 2¸ +1; (31)
¸ME = 2 ¡
p
19=9 ¼ 0:547; ¸FB = 2¡
p
2 ¼ 0: 586; (32)
p1 =
8>>><>>>:
¡13¸2+ 89¸ ¡ 49 if ¸ < ¸ME
1
6
¸2 ¡ 10
9
¸ + 25
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if ¸ ¸ ¸ME
; p2 =
2
3
¡ 1
3
¸; (33)
q1 =
8>>><>>>:
11
18¸
2 ¡ ¸+ 89 if ¸ < ¸ME
¡19¸2¡ ¸ + 1118 if ¸ ¸ ¸ME
; q2 =
1
3
+
1
3
¸: (34)
3.2.3 Remark on Experimentation Incentives
As mentioned above, in the planner solution the risky arm becomes less attractive
as the valuation ¸ for the safe alternative increases, that is, g0 < 0. However, we can
not rule out in general that this may change in the market game. For the impact of
an increase in ¸ on the incentive to experiment WR¡WS can be disentangled into
two e¤ects. On the one hand, WS increases, and this makes experimentation less
attractive. On the other hand, a change in ¸ leads in general to a change in the stage
2 equilibrium, in particular in the price di¤erential ¢. If j¢j declines, experimen-
tation becomes more attractive as the welfare loss in the market equilibrium under
experimentation, P [¸ +¢ > X ¸ ¸] (¸ ¡ E [X j¸ +¢ > X ¸ ¸]), declines. In this
case, the additional surplus created increases the buyer’s gross willingness to pay for
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the risky seller, WR, and thereby the incentive to experiment. In general, it could
be possible for the second e¤ect to dominate the …rst e¤ect.
4 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper is a …rst step towards extending the market exper-
imentation literature to the case of privately observed experimentation outcomes.
This leads to asymmetric information and, in contrast to the public information
setting, results in a welfare loss and in too little entry.
The qualitative conclusions of the analysis remain valid if the buyer is assumed to
obtain only an imperfect signal about the risky alternative, if the buyer is assumed
to be risk averse, if the safe alternative is rendered risky as well, and if the number of
sellers is increased. The model can easily be generalized along those lines. Essential
for our argument is the assumption of quasi-linear utility. This somewhat restricts
the relevant domain of the model. If the risks in question are very large, quasi-
linear utility might not be an adequate representation of the trade-o¤ the buyer
faces. Nevertheless, we conjecture that our qualitative conclusions still hold for
more general utility functions because, intuitively, the introduction of general utility
would essentially amount to a transformation of the random variable X.
What is, however, crucial for our results is the restriction to a two-period time
horizon. If for instance the time horizon is extended to three periods, the logic
of the model alters considerably. Consider the decision of an informed buyer at
the second stage. With three periods, this decision contains an additional strategic
element since the buyer’s choice reveals information about her valuation which can
be utilized by sellers for price setting in period 3. In particular, there will be a
ratchet e¤ect. Suppose the buyer learns in period 1 to have a high taste for the
risky seller’s good. On the one hand, this should increase the incentive to choose
the risky seller in period 2. On the other hand, however, if she chooses the risky
seller in period 2, the risky seller learns about the buyer’s high valuation and can
therefore set a high price, that is, rip o¤ the buyer in the terminal period. This
reduces the buyer’s incentive to choose the risky seller in period 2. We have not
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looked at how this e¤ect feeds back to the experimentation incentive in the initial
period, and we leave a full account of the problem to future research.
In a further direction of future investigation points the literature on multi-player
bandit games in which several players play the same bandit and can observe the
pay-o¤s obtained by other players as pioneered by Bolton/Harris (1999). Berge-
mann/Välimäki (2000) study a multi-player bandit game in a market context in
which bandits set prices. Kamp (1998), in an experience good context similar to
ours, considers a two-period model with a monopolist in which …rst period buyers
transmit information about their experience to second period buyers. Extensions
and variations of these approaches could shed more light on questions about how
the decentralized spread of information, like word-of-mouth communication or local
rumours, may a¤ect the performance of experience goods markets.
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